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Mostrando entradas con la etiqueta Methodologies. Mostrar todas las entradas
Mostrando entradas con la etiqueta Methodologies. Mostrar todas las entradas

Integrated Rapid Visual Screening Series (IRVS) for Buildings


The Integrated Rapid Visual Screening is a quick and simple tool designed to determine initial or relative risk and resilience for buildings based on visual inspection only. The IRVS for Buildings categorizes 15 building types and addresses 20 hazardous events: internal (intrusion, blast and CBR); external blast and external chemical, biological, and radiological releases from 100, 300 and 1,000 feet; earthquakes (ground shaking and ground failure; floods (still water and velocity surge); wind (hurricane, tornado, and other wind events); landslide (rainfall and earthquakes); and fire (resulting from earthquakes, blast, or arson. The knowledge for calculating both risk and resilience is embedded in the tool. Major tool interactions are automatically calculated by pre-assigned weights, interaction logic, and context-based algorithms based on knowledge and tool validations. Risk is based primarily in target attractiveness (for manmade hazards).

For natural hazards, it uses probability of occurrence. Risk is a product of consequences multiplied by threats multiplied by vulnerabilities. Resilience is computed from a combination of robustness, resourcefulness, and recovery factors based on information such as hardening, training, and redundancies. Information obtained from the IRVS analysis can be used by law enforcement agencies, emergency managers, facility managers, engineers and architects to support higher-level assessments and mitigation measures.

IRVS Software Highlights:

The software for the IRVS family of tools is now digital and includes integrated capabilities for mass transit, tunnels, and buildings in one software package. This facilitates data collection and functions as an effective data management tool. Assessors can use the software on a PC tablet or laptop to systematically collect, store, and report screening data. The software can be used during all phases of the IRVS process (pre-field, field, and post-field).
Capabilities include:
  • Digital catalogue and forms
  • Field data collection and storage
  • Automatic risk scoring
  • Printable reports
  • Google Earth application

Learn More:



http://www.dhs.gov/bips-04-integrated-rapid-visual-screening-series-irvs-buildings
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Building and Infrastructure Protection Series: Designing Buildings to Withstand Almost Anything


Building and Infrastructure Protection Series (BIPS) publications picture
By helping buildings withstand unusually severe hazards, the Department of Homeland Security's(DHS) Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) aims to keep critical infrastructure open for business.
In an ideal world, every tunnel, train terminal, and critical building would be built like a fortress to withstand any emergency. But in the real world, construction costs matter and engineers “build to code.” While Americans can take comfort that their critical infrastructure meets minimumcodes for safety, when terror—or nature—hits especially hard, minimum codes provide minimal comfort.
Now, thanks to researchers at DHS S&T, communities can fortify today’s critical structures—and design tomorrow’s—to absorb blows and remain open if assaulted by extreme earth, wind, water, fire, or man.
A new publication series, aimed at engineers, architects, building owners, city planners, and emergency managers, makes available years of government, industry, and academic research on designs and materials to make buildings and tunnels terror-resistant and terror-resilient. The Building and Infrastructure Protection Series (BIPS) provides architects and engineers a set of aids for designing critical infrastructure to withstand all kinds of hazards…at a cost that won’t break the budget.
“This series lays the foundation for designing a new generation of resilient buildings,” says Mila Kennett, who oversees the series in S&T’s Infrastructure Protection and Disaster Management Division, where she leads the Structural Resilience Branch. An architect by training, Kennett came from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), where she edited a similar publication series after 9/11. Several of the BIPS guides expand upon and update her highly regarded FEMA guides.
The BIPS series comprises seven documents, four software applications, one website, and one training course:
  • Aging of Infrastructure: Issues Research and Technology (BIPS 01) makes available the proceedings from the Directorate’s Aging Infrastructure Workshop, which focused on transportation.
  • Integrated Rapid Visual Screening (IRVS) software lets an inspector use a guided checklist on an iPad to quickly see how well a tunnel (BIPS 03), train station (BIPS 02), or building (BIPS 04) can withstand various assaults from nature or man. The findings can be used by police, emergency managers, facility managers, engineers, and architects as they size up and mitigate broader risks. 
  • IRVS for Mass Transit Stations (BIPS 02) lets an inspector quickly weigh the risk and resilience of a terminal used for trains or buses.
  • IRVS for Tunnels (BIPS 03) lets an inspector quickly weigh the risk and resilience of a tunnel. 
  • IRVS for Buildings (BIPS 04) lets an inspector quickly weigh the risk and resilience of a building. Restricted to law enforcers and other credentialed users, the software classifies the building into one of 15 types, scoring its resilience against 20 hazards.
  • Preventing Structures from Collapsing to Limit Damage to Adjacent Structures and Additional Loss of Life when Explosives Devices Impact Highly Populated Urban Centers (BIPS 05) documents the research and development that S&T conducted to develop BIPS 06.
  • Primer on Blast Load Effects in Urban Canyons: The Urban Blast Tool, or UBT (BIPS 06) is software that can quickly calculate how a bomb blast’s shockwave changes strength and course as it ripples through a cluttered cityscape. The software reveals the odds that the wave will cause a specific building to collapse. It also evaluates the odds that the wave will damage building equipment needed to carry out emergency evacuation, rescue, and recovery. Designed to model the effects of a bomb blast in the Manhattan Financial District, the software was deployed there in 2011. Future UBTs will do the same for other major metropolitan business districts.
  • Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings (BIPS 07)refreshes FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings. The manual identifies new ways to blunt the damage and limit casualties from various attacks. It also offers a new way to understand infrastructure resiliency and assess risk. 
  • Primer to Design Safe School Projects in Case of Terrorist Attacks and School Shootings (BIPS 08) updates FEMA 428, Primer to Design Safe School Projects in Case of Terrorist Attacks. The primer provides school designers and administrators a set of guidelines to design a school where children, faculty and staff will be safe during a physical attack or targeted shooting.
  • The Building Design for Homeland Security Training Course (BIPS 09) teaches architects, engineers, building owners, and law enforcers how to identify and weigh the risks posed by a wide range of manmade threats. During the course, participants practice ways to mitigate a range of hazards. 
  • High Performance Based Design for the Building Enclosure (BIPS 10) is a report that gives building owners, developers, and designers a standard way to evaluate the payoff from making key building attributes more resilient, energy-efficient, durable, and sustainable. A supporting application, the Owner’s Performance Requirements Tool, or OPR, can be used online. Eventually, the OPR will cover the key whole-building systems and other types of building.
The BIPS software applications and OPR website will be demonstrated February 1st in anS&T webinarCutting Edge Risk and Resiliency Tools.
Launched over the last three years, the BIPS books, applications, and training course have been embraced by the Transportation Security Administration, other federal agencies, the New York City Police Department, state and local governments, and the private sector.
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Design of Blast-resistant Buildings in Petrochemical Facilities

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Protecting Crowded Places: Design and Technical Issues

For pdf document;

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97992/design-tech-issues.pdf

References

1) https://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/threat-levels.html
2) www.dft.gov.uk
3) www.direct.gov.uk/nationalsecuritystrategy
4) http://download.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/nss/nss-factsheet2.pdf
5) For more information please see http://www.nactso.gov.uk
6) This document can be found on the Design Council website http://www.designcouncil.org.uk
7) http://www.dft.gov.uk/publications/manual-for-streets
8) http://www.dft.gov.uk/publications/inclusive-mobility
9) More information can be found at http://www.helm.org.uk/gheu
10) http://www.cpni.gov.uk/
11) http://www.cpni.gov.uk/advice/personnel-security1/ongoing-measures/
12) http://www.ico.gov.uk/for_organisations/data_protection/topic_guides/cctv.aspx
13) Further advice on CCTV is available from the CPNI website www.cpni.gov.uk; from the Centre for Applied Science and Technology website http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/science-research/hosdb/; and in NaCTSO guidance booklets available on the NaCTSO website www.nactso.gov.uk
14) BS EN 1992 has replaced BSI8110 although it is currently still in practical use.
15) BS EN 1993 has replaced BSI5950 although it is currently still in practical use.
16) More information about glazing can be found on the CPNI website http://www.cpni.gov.uk/advice/Physical-security/ebp/
17) http://www.cpni.gov.uk/
18) http://www.cpni.gov.uk/
19) http://www.nactso.gov.uk
20) http://www.cpni.gov.uk/
21) Further advice on RSES are also available from the Institute for Civil Engineers (see website:
www.ice.org.uk) and ICE details can also be found on www.cpni.gov.uk and www.nactso.gov.uk
22) http://www.nactso.gov.uk




















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ARCHITECTURAL AND STRUCTURAL DESIGN FOR BLAST RESISTANT BUILDINGS

for the pdf document: http://www.iitk.ac.in/nicee/wcee/article/14_05-01-0536.PDF

ARCHITECTURAL AND STRUCTURAL DESIGN FOR BLAST RESISTANT BUILDINGS

Zeynep Koccaz1 Fatih Sutcu2 Necdet Torunbalci3
1 MSc Student, Institute of Science, Technical University, Taskisla, Istanbul, Turkey
2 Research Associate PhD, Faculty of Architecture, Istanbul Technical University, Taskisla, Istanbul, Turkey

E-mail address: fatihsutcu@hotmail.com
3Associate Professor, Faculty of Architecture, Istanbul Technical University, Taskisla, Istanbul, Turkey

ABSTRACT

The increase in the number of terrorist attacks especially in the last few years has shown that the effect of blast loads on buildings is a serious matter that should be taken into consideration in the design process. Although these kinds of attacks are exceptional cases, man-made disasters; blast loads are in fact dynamic loads that need to be carefully calculated just like earthquake and wind loads.
The objective of this study is to shed light on blast resistant building design theories, the enhancement of building security against the effects of explosives in both architectural and structural design process and the design techniques that should be carried out. Firstly, explosives and explosion types have been explained briefly. In addition, the general aspects of explosion process have been presented to clarify the effects of explosives on buildings. To have a better understanding of explosives and characteristics of explosions will enable us to make blast resistant building design much more efficiently. Essential techniques for increasing the capacity of a building to provide protection against explosive effects is discussed both with an architectural and structural approach.

KEYWORDS: Blast resistant design, blast waves, explosive effects


INTRODUCTION

Damage to the assets, loss of life and social panic are factors that have to be minimized if the threat of terrorist action cannot be stopped. Designing the structures to be fully blast resistant is not an realistic and economical option, however current engineering and architectural knowledge can enhance the new and existing buildings to mitigate the effects of an explosion.

The main target of this study is to provide guidance to engineers and architects where there is a necessity of protection against the explosions caused by detonation of high explosives. The guidance describes measures for mitigating the effects of explosions, therefore providing protection for human, structure and the valuable equipment inside. The paper includes information about explosives, blast loading parameters and enhancements for blast resistant building design both with an architectural and structural approach. Only explosions caused by high explosives (chemical reactions) are considered within the study. High explosives are solid in form and are commonly termed condensed explosives. TNT (trinitrotoluene) is the most widely known example. There are 3 kinds of explosions which are unconfined explosions, confined explosions and explosions caused by explosives attached to the structure. [2]
Unconfined explosions can occur as an air-burst or a surface burst. In an air burst explosion, the detonation of the high explosive occurs above the ground level and intermediate amplification of the wave caused by ground reflections occurs prior to the arrival of the initial blast wave at a building (Figure 1) As the shock wave continues to propagate outwards along the ground surface, a front commonly called a Mach stem is formed by the interaction of the initial wave and the reflected wave.
However a surface burst explosion occurs when the detonation occurs close to or on the ground surface. The initial shock wave is reflected and amplified by the ground surface to produce a reflected wave. (Figure 2) Unlike the air burst, the reflected wave merges with the incident wave at the point of detonation and forms a single wave. In the majority of cases, terrorist activity occurres in built-up areas of cities, where devices are placed on or very near the ground surface.
Figure 1. Air burst with ground reflections Figure 2. Surface burst
When an explosion occurs within a building, the pressures associated with the initial shock front will be high and therefore will be amplified by their reflections within the building. This type of explosion is called a confined explosion. In addition and depending on the degree of confinement, the effects of the high temperatures and accumulation of gaseous products produced by the chemical reaction involved in the explosion will cause additional pressures and increase the load duration within the structure. Depending on the extent of venting, various types of confined explosions are possible. (Figure 3)
Fully vented partially vented fully confined
Figure 3. Fully vented, partially vented and fully confined explosions [2]
If detonating explosive is in contact with a structural component, e.g. a column, the arrival of the detonation wave at the surface of the explosive will generate intense stress waves in the material and resulting crushing of the material. Except that an explosive in contact with a structure produces similar effects to those of unconfined or confined explosions.
There are many forms of high explosive available and as each explosive has its own detonation characteristics, the properties of each blast wave will be different. TNT is being used as the standard benchmark, where all explosions can be expressed in terms of an equivalent charge mass of TNT. The most common method of equalization is based on the ratio of an explosive’s specific energy to that of TNT.

EXPLOSION PROCESS FOR HIGH EXPLOSIVES
An explosion occurs when a gas, liquid or solid material goes through a rapid chemical reaction. When the explosion occurs, gas products of the reaction are formed at a very high temperature and pressure at the source. These high pressure gasses expand rapidly into the surrounding area and a blast wave is formed. Because the gases are moving, they cause the surrounding air move as well. The damage caused by explosions is produced by the passage of compressed air in the blast wave. Blast waves propagate at supersonic speeds and reflected as they meet objects. As the blast wave continues to expand away from the source of the explosion its intensity diminishes and its effect on the objects is also reduced. However, within tunnels or enclosed passages, the blast wave will travel with very little diminution.
Close to the source of explosion the blast wave is formed and violently hot and expanding gases will exert intense loads which are difficult to quantify precisely. Once the blast wave has formed and propagating away from the source, it is convenient to separate out the different types of loading experienced by the surrounding objects.[3] Three effects have been identified in three categories. The effect rapidly compressing the surrounding air is called “air shock wave”. The air pressure and air movement effect due to the accumulation of gases from the explosion chemical reactions is called “dynamic pressure” and the effect rapidly compressing the ground is called “ground shock wave”.
The air shock wave produces an instantaneous increase in pressure above the ambient atmospheric pressure at a point some distance from the source. This is commonly referred to as overpressure. As a consequence, a pressure differential is generated between the combustion gases and the atmosphere, causing a reversal in the direction of flow, back towards the center of the explosion, known as a negative pressure phase. This is a negative pressure relative to atmospheric, rather than absolute negative pressure. (Figure 4) Equilibrium is reached when the air is returned to its original state.
Figure 4. Blast wave pressures plotted against time
As a rough approximation, 1kg of explosive produces about 1m3 of gas. As this gas expands, its act on the air surrounding the source of the explosion causes it to move and increase in pressure. The movement of the displaced air may affect nearby objects and cause damage. Except for a confinement case, the effects of the dynamic pressure diminish rapidly with distance from source.
The ground shock leaving the site of an explosion consists of three principal components [3]. A compression wave which travels radially from the source; a shear wave which travels radially and comprises particle movements in a plane normal to the radial direction where the ground shock wave intersects with the surface and a surface or Raleigh wave. These waves propagate at different velocities and alternate at different frequencies.

ARCHITECTURAL ASPECT OF BLAST RESISTANT BUILDING DESIGN
The target of blast resistant building design philosophy is minimizing the consequences to the structure and its inhabitants in the event of an explosion. A primary requirement is the prevention of catastrophic failure of the entire structure or large portions of it. It is also necessary to minimize the effects of blast waves transmitted into the building through openings and to minimize the effects of projectiles on the inhabitants of a building. However, in some cases blast resistant building design methods, conflicts with aesthetical concerns, accessibility variations, fire fighting regulations and the construction budget restrictions.
3.1
Planning and layout
Much can be done at the planning stage of a new building to reduce potential threats and the associated risks of injury and damage. The risk of a terrorist attack, necessity of blast protection for structural and non-structural members, adequate placing of shelter areas within a building should be considered for instance. In relation to an external threat, the priority should be to create as much stand-off distance between an external bomb and the building as possible. On congested city centers there may be little or no scope for repositioning the building, but what small stand-off there is should be secured where possible. This can be achieved by strategic location of obstructions such as bollards, trees and street furniture. Figure 5 shows a possible external layout for blast safe planning.
Figure 5. Schematic layout of site for protection against bombs [8]
3.2
Structural form and internal layout
Structural form is a parameter that greatly affects the blast loads on the building. Arches and domes are the types of structural forms that reduce the blast effects on the building compared with a cubicle form. The plan-shape of a building also has a significant influence on the magnitude of the blast load it is likely to experience. Complex shapes that cause multiple reflections of the blast wave should be discouraged. Projecting roofs or floors, and buildings that are U-shaped on plan are undesirable for this reason. It should be noted that single story buildings are more blast resistant compared with multi-story buildings if applicable.
The 14
th
World Conference on Earthquake Engineering
October 12-17, 2008, Beijing, China
Partially or fully embed buildings are quite blast resistant. These kinds of structures take the advantage of the shock absorbing property of the soil covered by. The soil provides protection in case of a nuclear explosion as well.
The internal layout of the building is another parameter that should be undertaken with the aim of isolating the value from the threat and should be arranged so that the highest exterior threat is separated by the greatest distance from the highest value asset. Foyer areas should be protected with reinforced concrete walls; double-dooring should be used and the doors should be arranged eccentrically within a corridor to prevent the blast pressure entering the internals of the building. Entrance to the building should be controlled and be separated from other parts of the building by robust construction for greater physical protection. An underpass beneath or car parking below or within the building should be avoided unless access to it can be effectively controlled.
Figure 6. Internal planning of a building
A possible fire that occurs within a structure after an explosion may increase the damage catasthrophically. Therefore the internal members of the building should be designed to resist the fire.
3.3
Bomb shelter areas
The bomb shelter areas are specially designated within the building where vulnerability from the effects of the explosion is at a minimum and where personnel can retire in the event of a bomb threat warning. These areas must afford reasonable protection against explosions; ideally be large enough to accommodate the personnel involved and be located so as to facilitate continual access. For modern-framed buildings, shelter areas should be located away from windows, external doors, external walls and the top floors if the roof is weak. Areas surrounded by full-height concrete walls should be selected and underground car parks, gas storage tanks, areas light weight partition walls, e.g. internal corridors, toilet areas, or conference should be avoided while locating the shelter areas. Basements can sometimes be useful shelter areas, but it is important to ensure that the building does not collapse on top of them.
The functional aspects of a bomb shelter area should accommodate all the occupants of the building; provide adequate communication with outside; provide sufficient ventilation and sanitation; limit the blast pressure to less than the ear drum rupture pressure and provide alternative means of escape.
3.4
Installations
Gas, water, steam installations, electrical connections, elevators and water storage systems should be planned to resist any explosion affects. Installation connections are critical points to be considered and should be avoided to use in high-risk deformation areas. Areas with high damage receiving potential e.g. external walls, ceilings, roof
The 14
th
World Conference on Earthquake Engineering
October 12-17, 2008, Beijing, China
slabs, car parking spaces and lobbies also should be avoided to locate the electrical and other installations. The main control units and installation feeding points should be protected from direct attacks. A reserve installation system should be provided for a potential explosion and should be located remote from the main installation system.
3.5
Glazing and cladding
Glass from broken and shattered windows could be responsible for a large number of injuries caused by an explosion in a city centre. The choice of a safer glazing material is critical and it has been found out that laminated glass is the most effective in this context. On the other hand, applying transparent polyester anti-shatter film to the inner surface of the glazing is as well an effective method.
For the cladding, several aspects of design should be considered to minimize the vulnerability of people within the building and damage to the building itself. The amount of glazing in the facade should be minimized. This will limit the amount of internal damage from the glazing and the amount of blast that can enter. It should also be ensured that the cladding is fixed to the structure securely with easily accessible fixings. This will allow rapid inspection after an explosion so that any failure or movement can be detected.
4
STRUCTURAL ASPECT OF BLAST RESISTANT BUILDING DESIGN
The front face of a building experiences peak overpressures due to reflection of an external blast wave. Once the initial blast wave has passed the reflected surface of the building, the peak overpressure decays to zero. As the sides and the top faces of the building are exposed to overpressures (which has no reflections and are lower than the reflected overpressures on the front face), a relieving effect of blast overpressure is experienced on the front face. The rear of the structure experiences no pressure until the blast wave has traveled the length of the structure and a compression wave has begun to move towards the centre of the rear face. Therefore the pressure built up is not instantaneous. On the other hand, there will be a time lag in the development of pressures and loads on the front and back faces. This time lag causes translational forces to act on the building in the direction of the blast wave. [4]
Figure 7. Sequence of air-blast effects [5]
Blast loadings are extra ordinary load cases however, during structural design, this effect should be taken into account with other loads by an adequate ratio. Similar to the static loaded case design, blast resistant dynamic design also uses the limit state design techniques which are collapse limit design and functionality limit design. In collapse limit design the target is to provide enough ductility to the building so that the explosion energy is distributed to the structure without overall collapse. For collapse limit design the behavior of structural member connections is crucial. In the case of an explosion, significant translational movement and moment occur and the loads involved should be transferred from the beams to columns. The structure doesn’t collapse after the explosion however it cannot function anymore.
Functionality limit design however, requires the building to continue functionality after a possible explosion occurred. Only non-structural members like windows or cladding may need maintenance after an explosion so that they should be designed ductile enough.
The 14
th
World Conference on Earthquake Engineering
October 12-17, 2008, Beijing, China
When the positive phase of the shock wave is shorter than the natural vibration period of the structure, the explosion effect vanishes before the structure responds. This kind of blast loading is defined as “impulsive loading”. If the positive phase is longer than the natural vibration period of the structure, the load can be assumed constant when the structure has maximum deformation. This maximum deformation is a function of the blast loading and the structural rigidity. This kind of blast loading is defined as “quasi-static loading”. Finally, if the positive phase duration is similar to the natural vibration period of the structure, the behavior of the structure becomes quite complicated. This case can be defined as “dynamic loading”.
Frame buildings designed to resist gravity, wind loads and earthquake loads in the normal way have frequently been found to be deficient in two respects. When subjected to blast loading; the failure of beam-to-column connections and the inability of the structure to tolerate load reversal. Beam-to-column connections can be subjected to very high forces as the result of an explosion. These forces will have a horizontal component arising from the walls of the building and a vertical component from the differential loading on the upper and lower surfaces of floors. Providing additional robustness to these connections can be a significant enhancement.
In the connections, normal details for static loading have been found to be inadequate for blast loading. Especially for the steelwork beam-to-column connections, it is essential for the connection to bear inelastic deformations so that the moment frames could still operate after an instantaneous explosion. Figure 8 shows the side-plate connection detail in question [7]. The main features to note in the reinforced concrete connection are the use of extra links and the location of the starter bars in the connection [3] (Figure 8). These enhancements are intended to reduce the risk of collapse or the connection be damaged, possibly as a result of a load reversal on the beam.
Figure 8. Enhanced beam-to-column connection details for steelwork [7] and reinforced concrete [3]
It is vital that in critical areas, full moment-resisting connections are made in order to ensure the load carrying capacity of structural members after an explosion. Beams acting primarily in bending may also carry significant axial load caused by the blast loading.
On the contrary, columns are predominantly loaded with axial forces under normal loading conditions, however under blast loading they may be subjected to bending. Such forces can lead to loss of load-carrying capacity of a section. In the case of an explosion, columns of a reinforced concrete structure are the most important members that should be protected. Two types of wrapping can be applied to provide this. Wrapping with steel belts or wrapping with carbon fiber-reinforced polymers (CFRP).
The 14
th
World Conference on Earthquake Engineering
October 12-17, 2008, Beijing, China
Cast-insitu reinforced concrete floor slabs are the preferred option for blast resistant buildings, but it may be necessary to consider the use of precast floors in some circumstances. Precast floor units are not recommended for use at first floor where the risk from an internal explosion is greatest. Lightweight roofs and more particularly, glass roofs should be avoided and a reinforced concrete or precast concrete slab is to be preferred.
5
RESULTS
The aim in blast resistant building design is to prevent the overall collapse of the building and fatal damages. Despite the fact that, the magnitude of the explosion and the loads caused by it cannot be anticipated perfectly, the most possible scenarios will let to find the necessary engineering and architectural solutions for it.
In the design process it is vital to determine the potential danger and the extent of this danger. Most importantly human safety should be provided. Moreover, to achieve functional continuity after an explosion, architectural and structural factors should be taken into account in the design process, and an optimum building plan should be put together.
This study is motivated from making buildings in a blast resistant way, pioneering to put the necessary regulations into practice for preventing human and structural loss due to the blast and other human-sourced hazards and creating a common sense about the explosions that they are possible threats in daily life. In this context, architectural and structural design of buildings should be specially considered.
During the architectural design, the behavior under extreme compression loading of the structural form, structural elements e.g. walls, flooring and secondary structural elements like cladding and glazing should be considered carefully. In conventional design, all structural elements are designed to resist the structural loads. But it should be remembered that, blast loads are unpredictable, instantaneous and extreme. Therefore, it is obvious that a building will receive less damage with a selected safety level and a blast resistant architectural design. On the other hand, these kinds of buildings will less attract the terrorist attacks.
Structural design after an environmental and architectural blast resistant design, as well stands for a great importance to prevent the overall collapse of a building. With correct selection of the structural system, well designed beam-column connections, structural elements designed adequately, moment frames that transfer sufficient load and high quality material; it’s possible to build a blast resistant building. Every single member should be designed to bear the possible blast loading. For the existing structures, retrofitting of the structural elements might be essential. Although these precautions will increase the cost of construction, to protect special buildings with terrorist attack risk like embassies, federal buildings or trade centers is unquestionable.


REFERENCES
[1] Koccaz Z. (2004) Blast Resistant Building Design, MSc Thesis, Istanbul Technical University, Istanbul, Turkey.
[2] Yandzio E., Gough M. (1999). Protection of Buildings Against Explosions, SCI Publication, Berkshire, U.K.
[3] Hill J.A., Courtney M.A. (1995). The structural Engineer’s Response to Explosion Damage. The Institution of Structural Engineer’s Report, SETO Ltd, London.
[4] Mays G.C., Smith P.D. (1995). Blast Effects on Buildings, Thomas Telford Publications, Heron Quay, London.
[5] Hinman E. (2008) Blast Safety of the Building Envelope, WBDG, US
[6] Remennikov A. (2003) Essay 1: The HSBC Bank Building Bombing: Analysis of Blast Loading, www.safeguardingaustralia.org.au/Essays/Essay3.html, Australia.
[7] Punch S. (1999) Blast Design of Steel Structures to Prevent Progressive Collapse, Structural Engineers Association Convention Proceedings, Santa Barbara, California, U.S.A.
[8] Smith P.D., Hetherington J.G. (1994) Blast and ballistic loading of structures. Butterworth Heinemann.
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more than 130 documents (Blast design - critical infrastructure) in the "library" Section

Some of the documents you can have a look and download in the "library" Section.
What are you waiting for?



1. Introduction by chairmen of WG3, M. Byfield and G. DeMatteis
2. State of the art in Europe and overview of the activity developed within WG3: ‘Impact and Explosion’, P. Smith
3. Robust design of steel framed buildings against extreme loading, M. Byfield, G. DeMatteis, F. Dinu
4. Aircraft impact on reinforced concrete structures, S.A. Kilic
5. Peak pressure in flats due to gas explosions, I. Langone & G. De Matteis, F. Mazzolani
6. Reconstruction, Seismic Strengthening and Repair of St. Athanasius Church damaged by explosion, V. Sendova, B. Stojanovski, L. Tashkov.
7. Analysis of reinforced concrete structures to blast loading, S. Karapinar, I. Sanri, G. Altay
8. The prevention of disproportionate collapse using catenary action, M. Byfield, S. Paramasivam
9. Robustness – Robust structures by joint ductility, U. Kuhlmann, L. Rölle, J.-P. Jaspart & J.-F. Demonceau


1. Impact on guardrails, impact of flotsam, scour and erosion, C. Seiler
2. Blast and Impact research, A. Tyas
3. Protective Design for RC Framed Structures against Blast loading – Safe Stand off Distance Approach, M. Byfield
4. Robust Structures by Joint Ductility, U. Kuhlmann, L. Rölle
5. Structural behaviour under extreme loading: blast effects on Pdextreme PdA, G. De Matteis, A. Eboli, I. Langone
6. Robustness of structuresRobustness structures: M-N interaction in beam-to-column composite joints, J.-F. Demonceau and J-P. Jaspart
7. Progressive collapse and explosion, V. Gioncu
8. Static and impact loading, N. Gresnigt - S. Karamanos
9. Impact test facility, A. Lastunen
10. The effectiveness of blast walls, P. Smith
11. Design for accidental actions in buildings, T. Vrouwenvelder, N. Gresnigt.
12. Ground shaking by the explosions and optimization of seismic effects, G. Mirakovski, L. Tashkov, V. Shendova

1. Swedish Defence Research Agency FOI - Research for a safer and more secure world, Annika Lööf
2. Hazard of Glazing Due to Blast Loading, Ans van Doormaal
3. Dynamic behaviour of structural materials, E. Cadoni
4. Advanced composite materials for strengthening, blast protection and seismic protection, P. Casadei.
5. Vulnerability of structures research group, L. Daudeville
6. Development of blast resistant steel-concrete composite columns, M. Mensinger, S. Trometer
7. Impacts against roadside barriers, M.Pernetti
8. Interaction of blast waves with flexible structures, M. Teich, N. Gebbeken, P. Warnstedt G. Nehring

1. Invited lecture: Design of high rise buildings to survive terrorist attack, D. Hadden
2. General report on WG3 activity, M.Byfield and G. DeMatteis
3. Aircraft impact testing Lastunen, J. Kuutti & K. Kolari
4. Protective design of r.c. framed buildings through safe stand off distance approach M. P. Byfield & S. Paramasivam
5. Response of high rise steel buildings as a result of column loss F. Dinu & D. Dubina
6. Hydrocarbon explosion loading G. De Matteis & P. Smith
7. Ductile and partial-strength steel & composite joints as a basis for redundant structures U. Kuhlmann, L. Rölle
8. Progressive collapse of buildings with key elements subjected to gas explosion, Langone,G. De Matteis & F.M. Mazzolani
9. Experimental and Analytical Investigations on building frames further to column loss, J. F. Demonceau & J.-P. Jaspart
10. Assessment, design and testing of guardrails due to vehicle impacts, C. Seiler
11. Effectiveness of seismic strengthening of monuments for blast resistance, V. Sendova & G. Jekic
12. The effectiveness of blast walls, P. D. Smith
13. Blast load assessment by simplified and advanced methods, P. D. Smith & A. Tyas
14. Seismic effects produced by explosions, L. Tashkov, G. Mirakovski
15. Small-scale blast load and structural response measurement, A. Tyas
· Blast effects on the Archimede bridge, G. De Matteis, A. Eboli, F.M. Mazzolani



M. CANDELA: Stresses characterization and quantification in masonry structures with bent axle: Methodological approach and first experiences
V. GIONCU & F.M. MAZZOLANI: Problems of seismic behaviour of buildings situated in urban habitats
C. NUNZIATA, F. VACCARI & G.F. PANZA: The Mw 6.3, 2009 L’Aquila earthquake: Linear and nonlinear site effects
F. ROMANELLI, A. PERESAN, F. VACCARI & G.F. PANZA: Scenarios based earthquake hazard assessment
V. SESOV & J. CVETANOVSKA: Microzonation of landslide hazard triggered by earthquakes – Application of GIS methodology
L. KWASNIEWSKI, M. BALCERZAK & J.WOJCIECHOWSKI: A feasibility study on modeling blast loading using ALE formulation
A. LOOF, A. VAN DOORMAAL & M. TEICH: Windows and glazing systems exposed to explosion loads: Part 1 – Lethality and hazard assessment
M. TEICH, N. GEBBEKEN, A. LOOF & A. VAN DOORMAAL: Windows and glazing systems exposed to explosion loads: Part 2 – Safety improvement strategies
A. TYAS, J.A. WARREN, J.B. DAVISON, E.P. STODDART & A. HINDLE: Dynamic testing of semi-rigid steel beam-column connections
E. NIGRO & C. FAELLA: Landslides as a secondary event of earthquakes and eruptions
C. NUNZIATA, G. DE NISCO, M.R. COSTANZO, F. VACCARI & G.F. PANZA: Measurements of shear wave velocities for seismic and volcanic hazard assessment in urban areas
T. ROSSETTO, T.O. LLOYD, C. COELHO, J.P. CARLIER & W. ALLSOP: Tsunami impact evaluation for coastal areas
M. AUDEBERT, A. BOUCHAIR, M. TAAZOUNT & D. DHIMA: Thermal and thermo-mechanical behaviour of timber connections in fire
A. TALON, J.P. MUZEAU & J.P. CARLIER: Avalanche actions on constructions
P. VILA REAL & N. LOPES: Evaluation of the steel structure fire resistance of a shopping centre using structural fire engineering
F.R. CARVALHO LOPES, A. SANTIAGO, L. SIMOES DA SILVA & J.G. SANTOS DA SILVA: Numerical assessment of structural assembly between steel beam and CFT columns under fire
M. HAJPAL & A. SOMORJAI: The effect of different plaster types on critical limit for fire resistance used by horizontal load-bearing structures
L. KWASNIEWSKI, P.A. KROL & K. ŁACKI: Numerical modeling of steel columns in fire
R. MARMO, M. D’ANIELLO, F. PORTIOLI & R. LANDOLFO: Finite element modelling of lap shear riveted connections in fire
E. NIGRO, A. FERRARO & G. CEFARELLI: Application of FSE approach to the structural fire safety assessment of steel-concrete composite structures
E. NIGRO, A. FERRARO & G. CEFARELLI: Member, substructure and global structural fire analyses of steelconcrete composite frames
D. PANTOUSA & E. MISTAKIDIS: Thermo-mechanical analysis of composite slabs under fire conditions
M. FERRAIOLI: Inelastic torsional response of an asymmetric-plan hospital building in Italy
C.  KYUNG SUK, K. HEUNG YOUL, K. HYUNG JUN, L. JAE SUNG & J. YOUNGHAN: An experimental study on the thermal property of concrete under the load ratio condition in tunnel fire
F. WALD, T. JANA, P. KYZLIK & M. STREJCEK: The composite slab on beams with corrugated web exposed to fire
R. ZAHARIA, D. PINTEA & D. DUBINA: Fire after earthquake
M. ANNECCHIARICO, F. PORTIOLI & R. LANDOLFO: Micro and macro-finite element modeling of brick masonry panels subject to lateral loadings
R. APOSTOLSKA, G. NECEVSKA-CVETANOVSKA & J. CVETANOVSKA: Seismic performance of RC frame buildings with masonry infill
M. D’ANIELLO, F. PORTIOLI & R. LANDOLFO: Modelling issues of steel braces under extreme cyclic actions
G. DELLA CORTE & F.M. MAZZOLANI: Response of BRBs to catastrophic seismic actions: Experimental results
F. DINU, D. DUBINA & G. DE MATTEIS: Direct design approach for seismic resistant steel frame buildings under extreme loading
D. DUBINA, A. STRATAN, F. DINU, D. GRECEA, N. MUNTEAN & C. VULCU: Application of high strength steel to seismic resistant multi-storey buildings
K. HEUNG YOUL, K. HYUNG JUN, L. JAE SUNG, K. KI HYUK, C. BONG HO: A Study on the Full Scale Fire Test of Medical Modular Block for the Fire Resistance Performance Evaluation


J. SANG-KEUN, K. SUN-HEE, C. SUNG-MO, W. YONG-AHN & K. HEUNG-YEOL: Evaluation of the residual strength of square CFT columns after a fire through structural performance evaluation test
L. FIORINO, O. IUORIO, V. MACILLO & R. LANDOLFO: Seismic response of sheathed cold-formed steel structures under catastrophic events
S. TORTORELLI, M. D’ANIELLO & R. LANDOLFO: Lateral capacity of steel structures designed according to EC8 under catastrophic seismic events
L. KRSTEVSKA, L. TASHKOV, K. GRAMATIKOV, F.M. MAZZOLANI & G. DE MATTEIS: Experimental methodology for verification of effectiveness of innovative seismic strengthening techniques of historical monuments
S.A. KILIC & P.D. SMITH: Behaviour of deformable blast walls for protective structural design
S.A. KILIC & P.D. SMITH: Simulation of pressures behind rigid blast walls
L. ROELLE & U. KUHLMANN: Robust design – Alternate load path method as design strategy
C. SEILER: Tests and simplified numerical simulation of vehicle impact on guardrails with respect to normative regulations
D.V. STOIAN, I.S. PESCARI, S.C. FLORUT & V.A. STOIAN: Behaviour and structural evaluation procedure of a precast R.C. multi-storey building subjected to blast loading
T. STATHOPOULOS, I. ZISIS & C.C. BANIOTOPOULOS: Structural design of urban habitat construction against catastrophic wind actions
A. GESUALDO & M. MONACO: Seismic vulnerability reduction of existing masonry buildings. Modelling of retrofitting techniques
F. DINU, D. DUBINA & C. NEAGU: Experimental evaluation of q factor for dual steel frames with dissipative shear walls
A. BIANCO & L. PICARDI: Seismic vulnerability by extrinsic kinematics: The St. Mary’s Church, Naples, Italy
M. INDIRLI, C. PUGLISI, A. SCREPANTI & F. ROMANELLI: Multi-hazard maps for the Valparaiso area, Chile
T. ROSSETTO, A.J. KAPPOS, L.A. KOURIS, M. INDIRLI, R.P. BORG, T.O. LLOYD & V. SWORD-DANIELS: Comparison of damage assessment methodologies for different natural hazard
A. TALON, J.P. MUZEAU & J.P. CARLIER: Avalanche risk assessment in populated areas
M. CVETKOVSKA & LJ. LAZAROV: Examination, assessment and repair of RC structure damaged by fire
E. NIGRO, G. CEFARELLI, A. BILOTTA, G. MANFREDI & E. COSENZA: Concrete members reinforced with FRP bars in fire situation
A. BASILE, G. BRANDO, G. DE MATTEIS & F.M. MAZZOLANI: Seismic protection of high-rise buildings by aluminium shear panels: a design application
S. BORDEA & D. DUBINA: Numerical and experimental evaluation of q factors for RC MRF strengthened of steel BRB
G. DE MATTEIS, G. BRANDO & F.M. MAZZOLANI: Mechanical behaviour evaluation of pure aluminium by static and dynamic tests
F. DINU, D. DUBINA & A. STRATAN: Evaluation of re-centring capability of dual frames with removable dissipative members: Case study for eccentrically braced frames with bolted links
A. DOGARIU, S. BORDEA & D. DUBINA: Behaviour model for post-tensioned bolted RC frame – steel brace connection
K.A. GEORGIADI-STEFANIDI & E. MISTADIKIS: Numerical investigation of old RC frames strengthened against earthquakes by high dissipation steel link elements
M.M. RAFI, S.H. LODI & S.A.F. RAFEEQI: An indigenous model of seismic retrofit of stone masonry structures
M. FERRAIOLI, A.M. AVOSSA & F. FORMATO: Base isolation seismic retrofit of a hospital building in Italy: Design and construction
M. FERRAIOLI, R. COSTANZO & A. LAVINO: Base isolation seismic retrofit of a hospital building in Italy: performance under earthquake strong ground motions
M. PRATICO', E. DI FEDE, G. MASCARELLA: Conservation and emergency: the façade of Saint Eusanio Martyr Church collapsed during the Abruzzo earthquake
C. PEREZ JIMENEZ, M. MINGUEZ FICA & J. DE LA QUINTANA: Identification of geometrical design criteria for reducing the vulnerability of urban area configurations to blast effects
L. KRSTEVSKA, L. TASHKOV, M. GAREVSKI & V. SHENDOVA: Application of base isolation techniques for seismic protection of structures-study cases
A. MANDARA, F. RAMUNDO & G. SPINA: Application of smart strategies against severe dynamic actions
E. CADONI, A. CAVERZAN & M. DI PRISCO: Behaviour of high performance fibre reinforced cementitious composites under high dynamic loading and fire for safe tunnel
V. SHENDOVA, G. JEKIC & L. TASHKOV: Effectiveness of seismic strengthening of monuments for their blast resistance

B. FAGGIANO, D. DE GREGORIO & F.M. MAZZOLANI: Assessment of the robustness of structures subjected to fire following earthquake through a performance-based approach
A. FORMISANO, P. DI FEO, M.R. GRIPPA & G. FLORIO: L ’Aquila earthquake - A survey in the historical centre of Castelvecchio Subequo
M. INDIRLI, F.M. MAZZOLANI & A. TRALLI: First considerations on the February 27, 2010 Chilean earthquake
F. PORTIOLI, O. MAMMANA, R. LANDOLFO & F.M. MAZZOLANI: Seismic assessment of historical mosques under exceptional earthquakes: a case study in Skopje
A.G. AYALA, M. MENDOZA & R. APOSTOLSKA: Development and validation of a procedure of seismic performance evaluation of structures
R.P. BORG, M. INDIRLI, T. ROSSETTO & L.A. KOURIS: L’Aquila earthquake April 6th, 2009: the damage assessment methodologies
A. FORMISANO, F.M. MAZZOLANI & M. INDIRLI: Seismic vulnerability analysis of a masonry school in the Vesuvius area
A. FORMISANO, F.M. MAZZOLANI, G. FLORIO & R. LANDOLFO: A quick methodology for seismic vulnerability assessment of historical masonry aggregates
A. FORMISANO, F.M. MAZZOLANI, G. FLORIO, R. LANDOLFO, G. DE MASI, G. DELLI PRISCOLI & M. INDIRLI: Seismic vulnerability analysis of historical centres: a GIS application in Torre del Greco
J.U. SICKERT, M. KALISKE, W. GRAF & A. MANDARA: Robust design of seismic up-grading of R.C. structures with innovative bracing systems
M.P. BYFIELD & S. PARAMASIVAM: Limitations of the tying force method for providing robustness in steel framed buildings
F. DINU & D. DUBINA: Effect of column loss on the robustness of a high rise steel building
A. FORMISANO & F.M. MAZZOLANI: On the catenary effect of steel buildings
G. SOLOMOS, F. CASADEI, G. GIANNOPOULOS & M. LARCHER: Assessment of explosion effect in railway stations
C. COELHO & J.P. CARLIER: Extreme flood effects as a combination of river and sea action
L. ALTERIO, D. DE GREGORIO, B. FAGGIANO, P. DI FEO, G. FLORIO, A. FORMISANO, F.M. MAZZOLANI, F. CACACE, G. ZUCCARO, R.P. BORG, C. COELHO, M. INDIRLI, L.A. KOURIS & V. SWORD-DANIELS: Survey activity for the seismic and volcanic vulnerability assessment in the Vesuvian area: The golden mile villas
M. FISCHINGER, M. KRAMAR & T. ISAKOVIC: Seismic Behaviour of Dowel Beam-Column Connections in Precast Industrial Buildings
L. KRSTEVSKA, L. TASHKOV, N. NAUMOVSKI, G. FLORIO, A. FORMISANO, A. FORNARO & R. LANDOLFO: In-situ experimental testing of four historical buildings damaged during the 2009 L’Aquila earthquake
L. TASHKOV, L. KRSTEVSKA, N. NAUMOVSKI, G. DE MATTEIS & G. BRANDO: Ambient vibration tests on three religious buildings in Goriano Sicoli damaged during the 2009 L’Aquila earthquake
D. DE GREGORIO, B. FAGGIANO, A. FORMISANO & F.M. MAZZOLANI: Air fall deposits due to explosive eruptions: action model and robustness assessment of the Vesuvian roofs
V. SWORD-DANIELS, T. ROSSETTO, J. TWIGG, D. JOHNSTON, T. WILSON, J. COLE, S. LOUGHLIN & S. SARGEANT: Review of the impacts of volcanic ash fall on urban environments
D. DE GREGORIO, B. FAGGIANO, G. FLORIO, A. FORMISANO, T. DE LUCIA, G. TERRACCIANO, F.M. MAZZOLANI, F. CACACE, G. CONTI, G. DE LUCA, G. FIORENTINO, C. PENNONE, G. ZUCCARO, R.P. BORG, C. COELHO, S. GERASIMIDIS & M. INDIRLI: Survey activity for the seismic and volcanic vulnerability assessment in the Vesuvian area: the historical centre and the residential area in Torre del Greco
B. FAGGIANO, E. NIGRO, D. DE GREGORIO, G. ZUCCARO & F. CACACE: Volcanic actions and their consequences on structures
G. FLORIO, D. DE GREGORIO, A. FORMISANO, B. FAGGIANO, T. DE LUCIA, G. TERRACCIANO, F.M. MAZZOLANI, F. CACACE, G. CONTI, G. DE LUCA, G. FIORENTINO, C. PENNONE, G. ZUCCARO, R.P. BORG, C. COELHO, S. GERASIMIDIS & M. INDIRLI: Survey activity for the seismic and volcanic vulnerability assessment in the Vesuvian area: relevant masonry and reinforced concrete school buildings in Torre del Greco
L.A. KOURIS, R.P. BORG & M. INDIRLI: The L’Aquila earthquake, April 6th, 2009: a review of seismic damage mechanisms
F.M. MAZZOLANI & M. INDIRLI: The Vesuvius case study in the framework of the EU COST Action C26 activity
F.M. MAZZOLANI, B. FAGGIANO, A. FORMISANO, D. DE GREGORIO, G. ZUCCARO, M. INDIRLI & R.P. BORG: Survey activity for the volcanic vulnerability in the Vesuvian area: the “quick” methodology and the survey form
H. NARASIMHAN, R.P. BORG, F. CACACE, G. ZUCCARO, M.H. FABER, D. DE GREGORIO, B. FAGGIANO, A. FORMISANO, F.M. MAZZOLANI & M. INDIRLI: A framework and guidelines for volcanic risk assessment
D. VAMVATSIKOS, L.A. KOURIS, G. PANAGOPOULOS, A.J. KAPPOS, E. NIGRO, T. ROSSETTO, T.O. LLOYD & T. STATHOPOULOS: Structural vulnerability assessment under natural hazards: a review
G. ZUCCARO & F. CACACE: Seismic impact scenarios in the volcanic areas in Campania
G. ZUCCARO & M.F. LEONE: Building technologies for the mitigation of volcanic risk
G. ZUCCARO, F. CACACE & M. RAUCCI: Vulnerability functions for building structures under volcanic actions
F. RAMUNDO & M.R. MIGLIORE: A model for limit state analysis of wooden structures


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